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0 0 1 8 -9 1 6 2 / 1 7/ $ 3 3 . 0 0 © 2 0 1 7 I E E E AFTERSHOCK I f Guinness World Records gave out an award for prolonged futility in successfully developing a US state government IT system, then South Carolina's Department of Social Services would surely be a contender for the "honor," in recognition of its protracted attempt to create an automated child-support enforcement system (CSES). The system, which is intended to aid courtordered child-support collections, was part of a federal government mandate under the Family Support Act of . Originally, all states were required to have a federally certi ed CSES in place by October ; however, when only Montana met the deadline, Congress extended it to October without imposing a nancial penalty. Currently, South Carolina's CSES is scheduled to become fully operational by October -assuming nothing else untoward happens.
The state's lengthy, tortuous path to creating a CSES began in early , and it's been downhill ever since. The rst attempt, which missed both the October and deadlines, ended in a bitter lawsuit between South Carolina and its CSES developer, Unisys Corporation, which wasn't resolved until late
. That e ort cost .
million. The next attempt began in , but it too ended in a rancorous lawsuit between the state and its system developer, the Hewlett-Packard Company, which was nally settled in early . This second e ort cost million. South Carolina's latest CSES implementation attempt, this time involving the Xerox Corporation, is expected to cost million when (or if) it goes operational as planned in October . The total projected cost of South Carolina's CSES will thus exceed million (with US taxpayers on the hook for million of that amount under federal-state cost-sharing agreements). Furthermore, the state faces a cumulative federal ne for missing the October deadline extension that's estimated to reach million (with million of that paid by the previous two CSES vendors as part of the lawsuit settlements).
On top of this staggering measurable cost for failing to develop a working CSES are the immeasurable yet very painful personal and nancial burdens felt by the untold number of families in the state who over the past two decades didn't receive their court-ordered child-support payments because of the absent system. Consider also the opportunity costs incurred by both South Carolina and US taxpayers who've been paying for the repeated, expensive foul-ups. The only true bene ciaries seem to be the system developers who didn't deliver.
IT's Fatal Amnesia

Robert N. Charette, ITABHI Corporation
If we continue to push our luck, the next decade of IT failures might create fi nancial and moral consequences that society just can't afford. Spectrum special online interactive report titled "Lessons from a Decade of IT Failures" (spectrum.ieee.org/static/lessons -from-a-decade-of-it-failures). Through our report, we wished to visually convey some of the many negative consequences of IT-related mishaps, whether developmental or operational (excluding cybercrime events), since the magazine's special issue on software failure a decade earlier (spectrum .ieee.org/magazine/ /September). We further wanted to nd out if there were any discernible patterns to these myriad incidents. Therefore, we structured the dataset to be viewed from multiple perspectives such as magnitude of impact (monetary cost, duration, number of people a ected, and so on), region (for example, the Americas, Asia Paci c, and EuMEA-Europe, the Middle East, and Asia), type of problem, type of organization, and industry area. We were also interested in any new lessons to be learned about the causes or sources of IT failures since those explored in the Spectrum special issue years earlier.
Even given the data's limitationsother than government audit reports and occasional court lings from lawsuits, there's sparse detailed, reliable, and veri able information on IT failures-some interesting observations can be made.
One is the growing cost of such failures. An article I wrote for the Spectrum special issue titled "Why Software Fails" listed some of the most prominent IT ascoes since . Although the list contained a handful of billion-dollar boondoggles, notably the aborted IRS Tax Systems Modernization program ( billion) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advanced Automation System ( . billion) in the US, the vast majority of individual IT project failure costs were under million. However, our review found a dozen or more developmental IT failures in the past decade in the billion-dollar range, including the UK Department of Health's National Programme for IT (NPfIT) electronic health record system ( billion) and the US National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) ( billion), with another seven e orts exceeding million. This group doesn't include exorbitantly expensive IT projects that are now operational like the US Air Force Defense Enterprise Accounting Management System (DEAMS) or Melbourne's myki public transportation ticketing system, which incurred . billion and million, respectively, in cost overruns.
Furthermore, there were numerous consequential IT operational failures. For example, in , the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) su ered a computing system disruption that prevented . million customers from accessing their nancial accounts for a week, and some customers were affected for more than six weeks. The ongoing cost of the incident including customer compensation, government nes, and IT system upgrades has topped . billion. Some operational IT failures a ected millions of people around the world. In , for instance, some million BlackBerry users across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa encountered various service disruptions for three days due to a hardware issue, making it the fourth such outage in as many years. Additionally, small, localized outages or other IT system malfunctions such as billing or payroll errors-most of which are never reported-impact tens of thousands of people across the globe each year.
Our limited dataset can't de nitively answer the question of whether IT failures occur more frequently than they did a decade ago-given the huge number of IT systems and related software in successful operation today versus , one could argue that they occur less often. However, we can con dently declare that IT failures, be they developmental or operational, are indeed getting more costly. The obvious question is, why?
EXPLORING A DECADE OF IT FAILURE PATTERNS
One equally obvious answer is that IT systems are much more interdependent now. The rapid proliferation of smart devices, cloud computing, and social media-to name but three information technologies that have entered the mainstream in the past decade-have accelerated the capability and desire to create ever more interconnected, integrated, and ultimately complex IT systems. In terms of data capture, storage, manipulation, and sharing, as well as algorithmic sophistication, today's IT The rapid proliferation of smart devices, cloud computing, and social media have accelerated the capability to create ever more interconnected, integrated, and ultimately complex IT systems.
AFTERSHOCK environment is considerably changed from that of the past. Alaska Airlines CEO Gary Kelly recently underscored this point: "Where once Alaska Airlines had essentially two computerized systems-its reservations platform, and the technology on each aircraft-it now has hundreds, controlling everything from maintenance to crew scheduling to its mobile app." 8 A problem with any one of these mutually dependent systems might affect many others, as Alaska discovered in 2011 when a central computer outage took out its reservation system, which in turn affected its flight planning and other support systems. Some 150 flights were canceled, and more than 12,000 passengers' plans disrupted. Virgin Blue (now Virgin Australia) Airlines, British Airways, American Airlines, JetBlue, Southwest Airlines, and United Continental Airlines have all had their share of operational outages over the past decade, too.
Many of the IT operational failures in our Spectrum dataset can be traced to system upgrades or routine maintenance to legacy systems, some decades old, that didn't go as expected.
The RBS incident wasn't an aberration: several other banks in the UK, US, Australia, and elsewhere have experienced repeated IT outages due to upgrades or maintenance issues along with failed backup systems. The recurring disruptions have motivated UK and Australian regulators to strongly urge their country's banks to improve outdated IT systems. 9, 10 Stock exchanges around the world have also experienced outages due to system modifications-for instance, the New York Stock Exchange shut down for four hours in 2015 because of an unrecoverable bug in a software upgrade.
The need to modernize legacy IT systems has also created plentiful opportunities for IT failure, especially in government. South Carolina wasn't alone in struggling to modernize its CSES; eight other states missed the extended 2007 deadline and were fined. 11 Efforts to modernize other state government legacy IT systems, such as social services, motor vehicle registration, and unemployment insurance, have similarly been fraught with problems. For example, in 2013, California canceled its second major motor vehicle system modernization halfway through development, citing "a lack of progress" after six years and $135 million. Similarly, in 2014, New Jersey canceled its Consolidated Assisted Support System (CASS) after spending $118 million over six years.
Government IT modernization efforts in other parts of the world have been equally disappointing. For example, the UK government canceled a revamped national benefits payments system in 2006 after spending $267 million, and the current multibilliondollar effort to replace it has seen at least $700 million written off in system rework so far. Likewise, the Netherlands Social Insurance Bank, which implements national insurance policies on behalf of the Dutch government, discarded a new $58 million benefits system in 2014 after persistent failures.
An emerging trend over the past decade has been national governmental efforts to modernize healthcare delivery and management through the use of IT by encouraging or mandating the use of electronic health records (EHRs) in hospitals and medical provider offices. Many of these efforts have run into serious trouble. In addition to the bungled UK NPfIT project, Australia, Canada, and the US each have had expensive EHR initiative failures.
More predictably, motor vehicles are increasingly a source of IT-related problems as software use in automobiles has exploded over the past decade. Typical was Toyota's 2014 worldwide recall of 1.9 million Prius hybrids-nearly half of all sold-to correct a software flaw that could damage the vehicle's engine. From 2011 to 2015, software-related recalls jumped from less than 5 percent to 15 percent and involved more than 13 million vehicles. Of the 189 software-specific recalls issued, nearly a quarter were for errors that raised the risk of crashing with injury. 12 There have also been some very public human-machine interface incidents during the past 10 years. Some are attributable to operator error, such as when a "fat-fingered" Tokyo Stock Exchange trader tried to order shares totaling $617 billion-more than Sweden's annual gross domestic productin one day in 2014. Others were more subtle, such as the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447, in which pilot confusion over how the Airbus 330-200 flight management system worked, coupled with poor warning system ergonomics and inadequate pilot training, conspired to bring down a perfectly flyable aircraft in bad weather. This incident, in conjunction with two other deadly 2009 accidents-a train-on-train collision in Washington, D.C.'s Metro system and the crash of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 13 -have raised questions about how much trust should be placed in automation. Such questions are starting to be raised about autonomously driven vehicles as well.
FORGETTING HARD-WON LESSONS
The aforementioned litany of IT developmental or operational failures is, of course, merely an outward symptom of deeper organizational, process, and
The need to modernize legacy IT systems has created plentiful opportunities for IT failure, especially in government.
technology-related decisions gone awry. In my 2005 Spectrum article on software failures, I listed several common factors that typically unite to help create such failures such as stakeholder politics, unrealistic or unarticulated project goals, poor project oversight, unmanaged risks, and an inability to handle the project's complexity, to mention but a few. Unsurprisingly, these factors haven't changed. One combination stands out in the 2015 dataset, however: the toxic merging of overweening political interference, quixotic project goals, and ignored risks, coupled with an abysmal memory of past IT failures. The data contain example after example of executive decision making perverted by what Bent Flyvbjerg, Massimo Garbuio, and Dan Lovallo call "delusional optimism." 14 The decisions underlying the IT failures Romero and I reviewed involved Icarus-like hubris, especially in government programs where the incentives to manage costs are low.
Take, for instance, the US Air Force Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS), which was finally terminated in 2012 after eight years and more than $1 billion worth of effort had produced no "significant military capability." 15 This was the Air Force's third failed attempt to implement an integrated logistics system going back to the mid1970s. Despite repeated pledges that they had learned from prior mistakes, especially with regard to being overly optimistic about what could be accomplished, when, and for how much money, ECSS managers still believed that they could successfully consolidate into a single IT system 28 times the number of systems any Department of Defense service or agency had previously tried to integrate. When the project inevitably failed yet again, the Air Force claimed the $1 billion spent was a good "first step" in learning how to build large, integrated systems and that it wasn't "necessary" to hold anyone responsible for the fiasco.
A series of high-profile government IT system failures occurred in 2013. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] California, Florida, and Massachusetts unveiled new unemployment insurance payments systems, and North Carolina rolled out two new social benefits systems-all with significant problems. Officials in each state assured the public that their system was ready to be deployed despite strong internal signals-and in the case of North Carolina, explicit warnings from the state auditor-to the contrary. Predictably, but still dishearteningly, each system immediately suffered vexing operational malfunctions that lasted weeks or months and, in some cases, even longer. As a result, hundreds of thousands of vulnerable residents faced totally unnecessary financial and health risks for prolonged periods of time.
It would be easy to argue that these "go live before its time" executive decisions crossed into the realm of what Guy Adams and Danny Balfour characterize as "administrative evil"-unjustly or needlessly inflicting pain on people. 25 In no instance were there circumstances sufficiently compelling to risk deploying an unready system.
Another case for administrative evil can be made for what has happened in Rhode Island. The state rolled out its $364 million Unified Health Infrastructure Project (UHIP) public assistance program in September 2016, years late and hundreds of millions of dollars over original cost estimates. 26 One would think that government officials would have investigated what happened in North Carolina and other states with similarly troubled programs to avoid their fates. Nevertheless, officials decided to go live with the system even in the face of warnings from both the state auditor and the federal government about faulty code development practices, insufficient testing, and improperly functioning interfaces. 27 Not surprisingly, UHIP suffered severe problems upon rollout that remain unresolved, causing financial hardship and healthcare disruptions for thousands of Rhode Island's poorest residents. 28 Pressed for an explanation, the director of the Department of Administration stated without irony, "Obviously, we're not where we want to be, but this is actually where we expected we'd be." 29 The federal government, unamused, has threatened the state with heavy fines if the system isn't fixed soon.
Lest one think this delusional mindset only affects government projects, consider recent IT debacles at Allied Irish Banks, 30 Avantor Performance Materials, 31 Bridgestone Corporation, 32 British Gas, 33 and ScanSource, 34 which all ended in lawsuits and reveal neither world-class IT project management nor well-thought-out executive decision making.
S
pace limits me here to highlighting only a few of the many insights to be gained from a decade of IT failures, and I encourage readers to explore the online IEEE Spectrum data themselves. However, one final lesson must be mentioned: future IT systems are likely to be more interdependent and algorithmically complex, with society more dependent upon them to operate effectively, efficiently, securely, and safelymaking system failures much more consequential. Thus, it's time to treat their development and operations with the respect, resources, and professionalism they deserve. To paraphrase what I wrote a decade ago in "Why Software Fails," we already know how to do software well. It's way past time to act on what we know. 7 If we continue to push our luck, the next decade of IT failures might create financial and moral consequences that society just can't afford.
